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1Over-Allocation or Abatement? A Preliminary Analysis of the
EU Emissions Trading Scheme Based on the 2005 Emissions Data
A. Denny Ellerman and Barbara Buchner †
Abstract
This paper provides an initial analysis of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) based
on the installation-level data for verified emissions and allowance allocations in the first trading year.
Those data, released on May 15, 2006, and subsequent updates revealed that CO2 emissions were about
4% lower than the allocated allowances. The main objective of the paper is to shed light on the extent to
which over-allocation and abatement have taken place in 2005. We propose a measure by which over-
allocation can be judged and provide estimates of abatement based on emissions data and indicators of
economic activity as well as trends in energy and carbon intensity. Finally, we discuss the insights and
implications that emerge from this tentative assessment.
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1. INTRODUCTION
On May 15, 2006, the European Commission officially released installation-level data for
verified emissions and allowance allocations for 2005, the first of the three years of the trial
period for the European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Those data and
subsequent updates revealed that CO2 emissions were about 80 million tons or 4% lower than the
number of allowances distributed to installations for 2005 emissions. This long position has been
interpreted as evidence of over-allocation, something that had been suspected but which seemed
belied by the higher than expected prices that had prevailed before the release of these data.
While over-allocation cannot be dismissed as a possibility, a long position is not per se evidence
of over-allocation. Installations that had abated in order to sell allowances or to bank them for
use in later years would appear in these data as long. In fact, it would be impossible based on a
simple comparison of allocations and emissions at the installation level to determine whether a
long position indicated over-allocation or abatement. Hence, the question posed by the title of
this paper.
                                                 
† Ellerman is Senior Lecturer at the Sloan School of Management at MIT. Barbara Buchner is Senior Researcher at
FEEM and a visitor at MIT during the preparation of this paper. From January 2007, she is Energy and
Environmental Analyst at the International Energy Agency.
2The rest of the paper is organized in four sections. The first presents and comments on the
2005 data as well as the price movements associated with the release of these data. Although a
full discussion of European Union Allowance (EUA) pricing is beyond the scope of this paper,
an understanding of what EUA prices did—and perhaps more importantly what they did not
do—bears on any discussion of over-allocation and abatement. The next section addresses over-
allocation and proposes a measure by which over-allocation can be judged. Then, we turn to
abatement and provide some estimates of abatement based on the 2005 emissions data and
economy-level indicators of economic activity and trends in energy and carbon intensity. The
last section concludes.
2. THE 2005 DATA AND EUA PRICES
Table 1 provides the 2005 installation-level data aggregated by member states ordered by the
size of the 2005 allocation. The last two columns indicate the extent to which the installations in
each member state are as a whole either long or short both in absolute and percentage terms.
A number of comments need to be made concerning these data. First, they are not complete.
A number of installations in some countries have yet to report and the entries for some
installations have changed since first reported in May 2006. The figures presented here are
updated through 31 October 2006, as of which date information on 10,046 installations in 23
Table 1. A general picture of the EU ETS in its first year.
Allocation 2005
(Mt CO2)
Emissions 2005
(Mt CO2)
Difference
(Mt CO2)
Difference
(Percentage)
TOTAL 2,087.9 2,006.6 81.3 3.9
Germany 495.0 474.0 20.9 4.2
Poland 235.6 205.4 30.1 12.8
Italy 215.8 225.3 –9.5 –4.4
UK 206.0 242.5 –36.4 –17.7
Spain 172.1 182.9 –10.8 –6.3
France 150.4 131.3 19.1 12.7
Czech Republic 96.9 82.5 14.5 14.9
Netherlands 86.5 80.4 6.1 7.1
Greece 71.1 71.3 –0.1 –0.2
Belgium 58.3 55.4 3.0 5.1
Finland 44.7 33.1 11.6 25.9
Denmark 37.3 26.5 10.8 29.0
Portugal 36.9 36.4 0.5 1.3
Austria 32.4 33.4 –1.0 –3.0
Slovakia 30.5 25.2 5.2 17.2
Hungary 30.2 26.0 4.2 13.9
Sweden 22.3 19.3 3.0 13.3
Ireland 19.2 22.4 –3.2 –16.4
Estonia 16.7 12.6 4.1 24.6
Lithuania 13.5 6.6 6.9 51.1
Slovenia 9.1 8.7 0.4 4.6
Latvia 4.1 2.9 1.2 29.9
Luxembourg 3.2 2.6 0.6 19.4
Source: Own calculations based on data provided by the CITL.
3member states had been made available on the CITL. 1 These installations account for 88% of the
installations and 96% of the EUAs allocated directly to installations. The remaining installations
are small and their emissions are not likely to change the over-all length of EU ETS in 2005
significantly.2
Second, the allowance totals for member states reflect the allowances distributed to
installations in 2005 and not the annual average of all allowances that will be distributed during
2005-07. European Union Allowances (EUAs) reserved for new entrants, auctions, or early
action awards are not included and in many cases these reserves have not yet been released.
Also, the allowances received by installations in the first year are not necessarily one third of the
total to be distributed to installations in the first trading period. Denmark, for instance, made
annual distributions in the three years of 40%, 30%, and 30%.
Third, and finally, these data do not indicate the amount of purchases and sales made by
specific facilities, although they do have implications for trading patterns. All that is indicated is
the difference between the 2005 allocation and 2005 verified emissions. Installations that are
shown to be short, that is, with 2005 emissions greater than the 2005 EUA allocation, can be
presumed to have purchased or otherwise acquired EUAs from other installations (or from their
own 2006 endowments) to be in compliance. Conversely, installations that are revealed to be
long would have EUAs for sale, but that doesn’t mean that they were made available to the
market or transferred to another facility having common ownership, although obviously many
had been sold or transferred in order for the installations that were short to be in compliance.
The release of the emissions data had a marked effect on EUA prices, as shown by the sharp
break in the price of all maturities of EUAs that can be observed in late April 2006 depicted on
Figure 1. Following announcements by the Netherlands and the Czech Republic on Tuesday,
April 25 that their emissions were 7% and 15% below the respective allocations to installations,
EUA prices fell by about 10%. Subsequent announcements from the Walloon region of Belgium,
France, and Spain revealing similarly long positions for the first two and a smaller than expected
shortage in Spain led to a closing spot price on Friday April 28 of  13.35, 54% below the
closing spot price on Monday, April 24, of  29.20. There were further, less severe fluctuations
of price until the complete data were released on May 15; however, the essential adjustment was
made in these four days and after May 15 the spot price remained close to  15 until late
September when a further less pronounced adjustment occurred.
                                                 
1 Data for Cyprus and Malta, which account for 0.3% of EU allowances and emissions, had not been reported to the
CITL when this paper was being prepared. Subsequent references to EU23 refer to data without Cyprus and Malta.
2 The main uncertainty involves Poland. In July 2006, the Commission released data for 459 installations (out of
1088) in Poland that received 90% of Poland’s annual allocation, which indicated a surplus equal to 12.8% of the
allowances allocated to those installations. The figures reported in Table 1 for Poland extrapolate this percent
surplus to the total allocation to Polish installations. However, as of Oct. 31, 2006, the CITL data show 481
installations with data for both allowances and emissions that constitute 60% of total allowances and which
indicate a surplus of 19%. Extrapolating this percentage to the whole would add another 14 million tons to
Poland’s and the EU surplus. This would increase the EU surplus in Table 1 from 3.9% to 4.6%. Like most
analysts and until a more complete accounting is available, we rely on the Commission’s more comprehensive
totals where an aggregate number is required, such as in Table 1, and on the CITL when installation data are
needed in our analysis.
4Figure 1. Price developments on the EU carbon market (OTC Market, November 2005 to October
2006). Source: Own calculations based on data from Point Carbon.
This price “collapse” demonstrated a readily observable characteristic of markets of reacting
quickly (and from the standpoint of some, brutally) to relevant information. And there should be
no doubt that the release of reliable information concerning emissions covered by a cap-and-
trade program is highly relevant. The cap is always known, but until aggregate emission data is
released no one has a really good idea of what aggregate emissions are, much less of how much
emission reduction or abatement is required to comply with the cap. The same phenomenon was
observed in the U.S. SO2 emissions trading program when the first auction revealed emissions
and the implied demand for allowances to be much less than expected (Ellerman et al., 2000). In
the case of the EU ETS, a similar adjustment of expectations concerning CO2 emissions and the
implied demand for EUAs occurred in response to the release of these data. Anyone doubting the
adjustment in expectations need only refer to the headline of the guest editorial in Point Carbon’s
April 21 edition of Carbon Market Europe—“CO2 price still too low”—and note the absence of
such articles since the end of April. While the obvious explanation of the price break in late April
is an adjustment of expectations, EUA prices did not go to zero and they have remained, even
after the most recent adjustment, at a level that approximates the high end of the initially
predicted price range.
3. DO THE 2005 DATA REVEAL OVER-ALLOCATION?
3.1 A Working Definition of Over-allocation
Over-allocation is not a well defined concept. The choice of words implies that too many
allowances were created, but the standard by which “too many” is to be determined is rarely
stated. Moreover, over-allocation tends to be conflated with being long, that is, having more
5allowances than emissions. Since any market presumes buyers and sellers and in an allowance
trading system the former will be short and the latter long, it cannot be the case that everyone is
short. Making sense of over-allocation requires both a standard of reference and some
understanding of the reasons that some installations are short and others long.
Two standards of reference can be imagined. The first is what emissions would have been
without the trading system, what can be called the counterfactual, and is termed BAU (for
Business as Usual) emissions in modeling exercises. Probably all would agree that handing out
more allowances than BAU emissions would constitute over-allocation. And if such were true,
there would of course be no constraint and no market unless participants were poorly informed
about the relationship between the cap and the counterfactual. A second standard of reference
could be a cap that is constraining, that is, less than the counterfactual, but still judged not
sufficiently ambitious. For instance, if the desired degree of ambition were a 5% reduction of
emissions from the counterfactual, and allowances were distributed such as to require only a 2%
reduction, the 3% difference might be considered over-allocation. While this second definition is
plausible and seemingly the one intended in much of the current debate, we argue that it would
be better to reserve the term “over-allocation” for the first definition to which all can agree.
Installations, or any aggregation of installations, such as a sector, member state, or even the
system as a whole, can be long or short for a number of reasons other than “over-allocation.”
One of the most obvious is the very incentive that motivates trading, differences in the marginal
cost of abatement. For any given allocation that is equitable and constraining, those installations
with lower cost of abatement would be expected to reduce emissions in order to free up
allowances to sell to installations that face higher costs of abatement. Such desired behavior
would show up in reported installation data, as that released in May 2006, as data points that are
both long and short according to the marginal cost of abatement at the covered installations.
A second reason for the appearance of a long position is uncertainty, the fact that the future is
rarely what is expected. Supposing again an initial equitable and constraining allocation, it is
inevitable that some installations will produce more than expected and others less. The
consequences in an emissions trading system are that the former will be short and the latter long.
It ought not to be argued that the installations that are long because they produced less than
expected, and therefore had lower emissions, were over-allocated, unless one is prepared to
argue that short installations were “under-allocated.” Given uncertainty, the only way to
overcome such over- and under-allocation would be to adjust allowances ex post, which would
remove at least some of the incentive to abate.
The effects of uncertainty are not limited to the components of an aggregate. To the extent
that economic activity, weather or any other factor affecting emissions deviates from what is
expected, counterfactual emissions will be higher or lower than expected and any given cap will
be more or less constraining with consequent effects on the positions of all the components.
Since stochastic disturbances will tend to have a greater effect at the installation level, short and
long positions will still occur but the proportions will change.
63.2 Presentation of the 2005 Data
With these considerations in mind, it is useful to look at the data for the sums of differences
between emissions and allocations at the installation level for various aggregates. Figure 2 and
Figure 3 do this for the EU as a whole and for the constituent member states both in absolute
and relative terms. In both of these figures, the data are portrayed as the sum of the differences
for all the installations having long and short positions, respectively as “gross long” and “gross
short.” Each aggregate then has either a “net long” or a “net short” position (indicated by the
bold red and blue bars) and that is equal to the difference between the “gross long” and “gross
short” data points for that aggregate.
Figure 2, where the differences are expressed as percentages of the total allocation to
installations constituting the aggregate, is the more instructive display of the information for the
purposes of developing some measure of over-allocation. Lithuania can serve as an example of
evident over-allocation. Only three installations were short and the difference between total
emissions and total allowances allocated to installations was slightly over 50% of 2005
emissions. While over-allocation seems evident, figuring out how much would be difficult since
it is quite possible that the levels of economic activity in Lithuania were not what was expected,
that Lithuanian installations may have abated, or that some other factor may explain some or all
of the long position.
At the other extreme is the UK where installations were both long and short, but the extent to
which installations were short was much greater than the corresponding figure for installations
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Figure 2. Short and long positions by member state in percent. Source: CITL and Kettner et al. (2006).
7-55 -45 -35 -25 -15 -5 5 15 25 35 45
Poland
Germany
France
Czech
Finland
Denmark
Lithuania
Netherlands
Slovakia
Hungary
Estonia
Sweden
Belgium
Latvia
Luxembourg
Portugal
Slovenia
Greece
Austria
Ireland
Italy
Spain
UK
MtCO2
Net Short Net Long Gross Short Gross Long
Figure 3. Short and long positions by member state in MtCO2. Source: CITL and Kettner et al. (2006).
that were long such that emissions were 18% greater than the allocation. Clearly, the UK as a
whole cannot be considered to have been over-allocated even if some firms and sectors may be
long. Also, the short position may be created, not so much by intention, but by higher levels of
economic activity than expected or other unexpected events, such as high natural gas prices,
created a larger number of short positions. Still, these two cases illustrate the point that subject to
the qualifications we have noted, it would be as hard to argue that the UK was “over-allocated”
as it would be to argue that Lithuania was not.
Having set up two polar cases, Figure 2 illustrates the great diversity among the EU member
states. As indicated by the top bar, the situation of the EU as a whole is balanced, but the
member states fall roughly into four categories. The first includes those like Lithuania where all
or nearly all the installations are long and by a considerable amount. This group comprises the
first nine member states from the top in Figure 2. In addition to having no or few installations
that were short, the long position is in excess of 15% of the total allocation. The next three
member states, Hungary, Sweden and France, constitute a second group that are similar in
having significant long positions, between 10% and 15% of the allowance allocation, but with
more short installations, especially in Sweden. The third group consists of the next five member
states—Holland, Germany, Belgium, Slovenia, and Portugal—that are long on balance but by
relatively modest amounts that would fall well within what might be expected as a result of a
relative advantage in abatement or less favorable economic, meteorological, or other
circumstances in 2005. The final group is of course the six member states who were on balance
short: Greece, Austria, Italy, Ireland, Spain, and the UK.
8While Figure 2 is the more helpful of these two diagrams for evaluating the presence of over-
allocation, Figure 3 is necessary to put the phenomenon in perspective and it provides a good
picture of the main sources of demand and potential supply of EUAs in the market in 2005. The
gross shorts, totaling 180 MtCO2, are located mostly (80%) in four countries: the UK, Spain,
Italy, and Germany. The same four countries, plus France and Poland, constitute the largest part
of the potential sellers’ side of the market with approximately 150 of the 250 MtCO2 allocated to
installations that were not needed to cover their emissions in 2005, or about 60% of the total.
Many of the trades were undoubtedly within the same countries, but there were also net transfers
of EUAs among member states and borrowing from the 2006 allocation. An analysis conducted
by the Italian registry of the trading patterns of Italian companies and the origin of surrendered
permits revealed that 7.8 million of the 43.3 million EUAs by which Italian installations were
short were covered by borrowing and that 7.0 million of surrendered EUAs were initially issued
to installations outside of Italy (Point Carbon News, Oct. 30, 2006). Thus, 66% of the gross short
position of Italy was covered by redistribution of EUAs among installations in Italy, 18% by
borrowing from the installations’ forward allocation, and 16% by purchases outside of Italy.
The net positions displayed in Figures 2 and 3 imply transfers of allowances among member
states although internal borrowing would also be a possibility. The net balances imply that 60%
of the demand for international trading came from the UK with another 18% from Spain, 16%
from Italy and the remaining 6% from Ireland, Austria, and Greece. The potential suppliers were
more evenly distributed with Germany, Poland, and France accounting for about half of the total.
The analysis by the Italian registry indicates that 74% of Italy’s net short position of 9.5 million
EUAs was covered by purchases from abroad and the remainder by within-country borrowing.
The remaining 5.4 million tons of borrowed EUAs substituted for purchases or transfers from
other installations within Italy.
Member states are not the only aggregates into which the installation data can be aggregated.
Another break-out is by economic sector, as is done in Figures 4 and 5. By this grouping, the
power sector is in the aggregate modestly short (by about 3%), while all the other sectors are
long by more significant percentages. Among these industrial sectors, three—ceramics, bricks
and tile; iron, steel and coke; and pulp and paper—are long by more than 15% of the allocation
to these sectors. When placed in the perspective of the volume of emissions, as in Figure 5, the
power sector dominates the potential market. Virtually all of the compliance demand for EUAs
in 2005 came from the power sector, as well as about half of the total potential supply.
When sector and regional classifications are combined, an even clearer picture of the implied
redistribution of allowances is obtained. In Figure 6, the sectors are grouped into power and heat
and all others (generically industry) and aggregated into regions defined as the EU 15 and the
8 East European accession states. The power and heat sector in the EU15 is the only player in the
EU ETS that has been characterized by an overall net short position. More than half of the net
length is located in Eastern Europe, although given the registry problems in Eastern Europe,
most of the net short position of the EU15 power and heat sector was probably covered by
purchases from the EU15 industrial sectors.
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Figure 4. Short and long positions by EU-wide sectors.
Source: CITL and Kettner et al. (2006).
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Figure 5. Short and long positions by EU-wide sectors in absolute terms.
Source: CITL and Kettner et al. (2006).
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Figure 6. A breakdown of short and long positions by major sectors and regions.
3.3 A Measure of Over-allocation
A measure of the likelihood of over-allocation can be calculated from this data based on the
earlier discussion of what might cause long positions. Any aggregate of installation data will
typically show the group to be either long or net on balance and to have some component long
and others short. For each, a ratio can be calculated from the net position in relation to the
corresponding long or short position, such as indicated below:
 
Net Ratio =
Net Long or Short
Gross Long or Short
.
To take our earlier examples, Lithuania would have a ratio of +1.0 since it was long and its
net long position is identical to its gross long position. Conversely, the UK has a ratio of –0.72
since its net short position is 72% of the sum of the amounts by which all short installations were
short. By definition, the net ratio is limited to values between –1.0 and +1.0 with negative
numbers indicated that the aggregate or member state is short over-all and positive values
indicating the opposite.
A negative net ratio suggests that no obvious over-allocation has taken place. Sectors within a
member state may be over-allocated, but if the member state as a whole is not, the over-
allocation is compensated by an implied under-allocation to other sectors. While such
differentiation can create problems for sectors that compete across national boundaries, this
differentiation can be regarded as an internal matter not significantly different from other forms
of assistance or regulatory treatment that may advantage or disadvantage a sector relative to
competitors in other countries.
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Member states that have positive ratios would need to be divided into two groups depending
on where the line is drawn for indicating over-allocation. The first sub-group would be those
with a high positive ratio indicated few installations that were short. This leaves a second group
with a net ratio that is positive but not excessive. There is no a priori answer concerning where
to draw the line between these two groups, but the data clusters in a manner that allows some to
be clearly assigned to one group or the other.
Figure 7 represents the distribution of allowances by member states expressed as a percentage
of the EU25 allocation according to their net ratios. The part of the columns labeled “base”
represents emissions that were covered by allocated allowances. The blue parts of the columns
labeled “purchase” indicate emissions that were greater that the allocation for those member
states with a net ratio from –1.0 to zero. The red parts of the columns labeled “sold” indicate
allocated allowances in excess of emissions for those countries with a net ratio between 0 and +1.
The UK and Ireland, representing about 12% of the overall EU25 allocation, are the two
countries characterized by the shortest positions and a net short that is approximately 2% of all
the EUAs issued by the EU25. The next four countries—Spain, Italy, Austria, and Greece—
account for about 25% of total EUAs and they are all short but less so than the UK and Ireland.
On the side of the longs, Belgium and Portugal, have relatively balanced positions not unlike the
previous four on the short side of the ledger. Germany’s size will cause the category in which it
falls to dominate all the others and so it is for the group with net ratios between +0.4 and +0.6,
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Figure 7. Distribution of EUAs by Net Ratio.
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which constitutes almost one third of the total allocation. The next two groups, with net ratios
higher than +0.6 include the member states for which the evidence of over-allocation is much
stronger. They constitute about 29% of the EU25 total and their combined surplus is about 5%.
Where to place the threshold for what might be considered a presumption of over-allocation is
obviously a difficult decision. It should be drawn at a relatively high net positive ratio for the
reasons explained earlier and even then other factors should be considered before coming to a
definitive conclusion. The important point is not that there were some member states for which
over-allocation is indicated, but that there were so many for which that was not the case. Even
with a relatively low presumptive threshold for over-allocation of +0.60, eleven member states
that distributed 71% of all EUAs cannot be viewed as involving over-allocation. And for the
29% remaining, about 24% of the allowances were required to cover emissions in 2005 so that
the net potential over-allocation is on the order of 5% or 100 million EUAs, assuming that none
of the length can be attributed to abatement or unexpected conditions that create length in 2005
but could not be expected to do so in the future.
Whatever the correct magnitude of this estimate, it needs to be placed in context. First, it is not
necessarily a complete indicator of the over-all length of the EU ETS at this point in time since the
allowances reported are those distributed to installations in 2005. It does not include many of the
allowances in reserves for new entrants, auctions, or other purposes that had not been distributed
by the end of 2005. While these reserves are not specifically reserved for any single year, most of
them will become available before the end of 2007. If the three-year total for all EUAs is divided
by three, another 85 million EUAs are indicated as 2005 allowances not yet distributed. A second
observation concerns the greater over-allocation that was avoided by the cuts that the Commission
required from a number of first period National Allocation Plans (NAPs). These totaled 290
million EUAs, approximately equal on an annual average to the potential over-allocation indicated
by an analysis of the 2005 data. Finally, over-allocation indicates very little about abatement or the
reduction of emissions that is the fundamental object of the EU ETS. We now turn to this second
part of the question that we pose in the title to this paper.
4. HAS THE EU ETS REDUCED CO2 EMISSIONS?
4.1 Some Initial Considerations
Just as being long or short is a difference between emissions and allocation, so abatement is a
difference between emissions and the counterfactual, or what CO2 emissions would have been in
the absence of the EU ETS. And, while the first difference can be readily deduced from two
observable data points, the second difference can never be determined with certainty because the
counterfactual is not observed and never will be. It can only be estimated, but there are better and
worse estimates and much can be done to narrow the range of uncertainty, particularly when the
evaluation is done ex post when the levels of economic activity, weather, energy prices and other
factors affecting the demand for allowances are known.
In the case of the EU ETS, forming a good estimate of the counterfactual is complicated by
the lack of historical data corresponding to the installations included in the scheme. Reasonably
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good data exist for the CO2 emissions of the EU member states, however the EU ETS includes
only a part—ranging from 30% to 70%—of each member state’s emissions. And, prior to the
start of the EU ETS, there was no reason to collect or to publish data on sectors or installations
that were to constitute the EU ETS. One not entirely satisfactory source of the data for these
installations is that collected to establish an historical “baseline.” All the member states collected
recent emissions data in the process of developing the first set of National Allocation Plans
during 2004 in order to establish an initial point for projecting what emissions were expected to
be in 2005-07 for the trading sector as a whole, and for specific industrial sectors, and for
allocating allowances to the installations included in the scheme. While this data source provides
a much needed reference point, it suffers from two problems: potential bias and imperfect
comparability.
The potential bias in the data arises from the process by which the data were collected. As
described in Ellerman, Buchner and Carraro (forthcoming), the data collection effort was largely
a voluntary submission by the industries involved and it was conducted under severe time
pressures that did not allow for as much verification as could be desired. Cooperation in
submitting the data is reported as good, perhaps not surprisingly since allowance allocations
would depend on the data submitted; but for that reason there was also an incentive to resolve
uncertainties in favor of higher emissions. While this incentive clearly existed, its role should not
be exaggerated. The government officials cross-checked the data submitted with other
information that was often available, as well as checking it for internal consistency. Also, a
certain degree of internal discipline could be expected within the process from firms who would
not be indifferent to inflated claims by competitors. The important point is not that these data
should be accepted as is, or rejected out-of-hand, but that the extent of bias be measured or at
least taken into account. It would be wonderful if there were other more reliable data that could
be used, but in its absence, the baseline data is all that exists to enable an estimate of the extent to
which the EU ETS met its primary objective of reducing CO2 emissions.
The second problem with the baseline data is that the components to be summed across the
EU are not fully comparable. Although all member states sought a measure of recent emissions
in developing their baselines, the definitions varied. For all, it was an average of recent years
ending with 2003, the last year for which data was available, but the years included in the
average varied from two to six. Moreover, special provisions were sometimes adopted that let
minimum observations be dropped, as in the UK, or for more recent 2004 data to be used instead
of the historical average, as in the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, there are presently no other
data and the historical baseline data have the merit of reflecting relatively recent years (e.g.,
around 2001-2003) for the installations in the EU ETS. As with the problem of bias, the solution
is not to throw out the baseline data but to understand and to measure the errors that may be
created by incomplete comparability.
4.2 Verified Emissions Compared to Baseline Emissions
With these significant qualifications in mind, we now present the historical baseline data in
comparison with corresponding data on allowances and verified emissions. Historical emissions
14
must not be thought of as the counterfactual for 2005; it is the starting point before taking
account of changes that would have occurred between the historical reference point and the year
of the counterfactual, as we will do in the next section. Figure 8 provides the comparison on a
country-specific basis. In each cluster, the historical baseline is the right-hand column, the 2005
allocation, the center column; and verified emissions, the left hand column.
There are six different combinations in which verified emissions, allowances, and baseline
emissions can be combined as shown in Table 2.
Member states can be divided into two groups: those will allowance totals less than baseline
emissions (7 member states with 53% of allowances) and those with the opposite relation
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Figure 8. Comparison of 2005 emissions with base period emissions.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the CITL, the EC, and DEHSt (2005).
Table 2. Allowances (A), emissions (E), and baseline (B) relations.
Combination Countries % of Allocation Combination Countries % of Allocation
Allowances less than Baseline Allowances more than Baseline
E < A < B Belgium
Germany
Netherlands
Hungary
32% E < B < A Denmark Finland
France  Luxemburg
Portugal Sweden
Czech Rep Latvia
Lithuania Poland
Slovakia Slovenia
33%
A < E < B UK 10% B < E < A Estonia 1%
A < B < E Italy
Ireland
11% B < A < E Austria
Greece
Spain
13%
Source: Derived by authors from CITL data.
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(16 member states with 47% of allowances). The former would be countries who expect
emissions to decline from baseline levels, such as the UK, or that have challenging Kyoto targets
through the European Burden Sharing Agreement (BSA) for which they are preparing, such as
Italy and Ireland. The latter group typically includes those who do not appear likely to have
difficulty in meeting their Kyoto obligation and for which emissions are expected to grow from
historical baseline levels, such as the countries in Eastern Europe. The majority of EU15 member
states also fall into this category, even some who face significant problems meeting their Kyoto
obligations. Whatever the relation between the allowance total and baseline emissions, verified
emissions may be lower than allowances and baseline emissions (16 countries with 65% of
allowances) and which are all long in the 2005 data, higher than both (5 countries with 24% of
allowances) and which are all short, or between the two (2 countries with 11% of allowances).
Figure 9 presents these country-specific data points summed into a whole for the EU23 and
for the regional distinction between the EU15 and the 8 East European accession states
(subsequently EE8). For the EU23, verified emissions are 3.4% less than baseline emissions and
the corresponding percentages for the EU15 and the EE8 are –2.4% and –7.8%. In these three
aggregated comparisons, the middle column representing allowances indicates the allowances
distributed directly to installations by the solid color. The hatched area at the top of each column
indicates the difference between the number of allowances distributed to installations in 2005
and one-third of the cumulative three-year total for each member state. These are allowances that
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have been reserved for auctions, new entrant or early action reserves, or other special provisions.
Most of these reserved allowances were not distributed in 2005, but most of them will be issued
before the end of 2007. It is to be noted that when the reserves are included the over-all long
position for the EU ETS in 2005 is 8% and not the 4% figure that is based on the distribution to
installations. This extra length has definite implications for the price of EUAs, but for the
purpose of determining abatement in 2005 that extra length is not relevant although it may be for
abatement in 2006 and 2007 to the extent that prices decline as a consequence and have an effect
on abatement.
4.3 Changes in Real Output and Carbon Intensity since 2002
The comparison of verified emissions with the baseline in the preceding section does not take
account of factors that would influence the level of CO2 emissions between 2002 and 2005.
Continuing GDP growth, or more specifically in growth in the output of the sectors included in
the EU ETS, would be expected to causes emissions to increase and for the 2005 counterfactual
to be higher than the historical baseline. Also, CO2 emissions typically do not grow at the same
rate as real output because of the observed, long standing tendency towards improved carbon
intensity for most economies. In addition to these trend factors, there are a number of
unpredictable conditions, such as the weather and energy prices, that will increase or decrease
counterfactual emissions and the demand for allowances depending on their realization relative
to the initial expectation.
Economic growth since 2002 has been relatively robust in the EU and particularly in the East
European accession states as shown in Figure 10 where an index describing developments in
GDP measured in constant prices in Europe in relation to the year 2002 is depicted. For the EU
as a whole, GDP has grown by almost 6% by 2005 compared to 2002. The figure is slightly
lower for the EU15 where most of the economic activity occurs and significantly higher, +15%,
for the Eastern European countries. We use 2002 as an approximate center point for the baseline
emissions although for some countries with longer baseline periods, it might more appropriately
be earlier.
GDP reflects a broader definition of economic activity than what is included in the EU ETS,
but the same pattern is obtained when more sector–specific indices of economic activity are
used, as shown by Figure 11. These indices show monthly activity since the beginning of 2002
through mid-2006 and each series is normalized to its average value in 2002. All of these indices
indicate higher levels of real output in 2005 than in 2002. The two most important series,
electricity and industrial output excluding construction, are about 5.5% and 4.0% above the
average 2002 level of output. More specific, industrial sector indices show increases of about 6%
for cement, 5% for pulp and paper, 3% for iron and steel, and 2.3% for glass, bricks, tiles, and
ceramics. Temporary declines in output of iron and steel and of pulp and paper can be observed
in 2005, but these were temporary and the output levels observed as of mid-2006 for all sectors
are higher than in 2005.
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Figure 10. GDP growth in the European Union.
Source: Own calculations based on IMF data.
Figure 11. Indicators of economic activity in the EU25 (2002-2006).
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data.
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Since CO2 emissions typically do not increase at the same rate as broad indicators of economic
activity, some estimate of the improvement in CO2 intensity must be taken into account in
estimating a counterfactual for 2005. Because of the paucity of industry-specific data on carbon
intensity, we examine first the trends in carbon intensity for the economy as a whole for the EU
and its constituent parts and then consider whether the economy-wide data can be considered
representative of the EU ETS sectors based on the sector specific data that is available.
Table 3 provides a comparison of the annual rates of growth for real GDP, CO2 emissions,
and the implied change in CO2 intensity between 1995-2000 and 2000-2004 for the EU23, the
EU15 and the EE8. Real GDP growth has been less in recent years than in the last half of the
1990s but the recent rate of increase in CO2 emissions has been greater than in the earlier period.
The inescapable result is that the rate in improvement in CO2 intensity slowed noticeably around
2000. These trends are especially pronounced in the EU15, but they are also true for the new
East European member states. CO2 intensity is still improving, especially in Eastern Europe, has
diminished sufficiently that the CO2 emissions are increasing at a faster rate than they were in the
late 1990s despite slower growth in real GDP.
This slowing in the rate of decline in CO2 intensity since 2000 raises an obvious problem with
extrapolating the declines in carbon and energy intensity experienced during the 1990s beyond
2000. For the purpose of establishing a counterfactual for 2005, we assume that the trend prevailing
since 2000 is the appropriate one. Economy-wide CO2 emissions data are available for two of the
three years between 2002 and 2005 and nothing in the data for 2005 suggests that the trend has
reversed. In fact, given the 2004 data and the increase in real output between 2004 and 2005, a
return to the 2002 emissions level (without the EU ETS) would imply a one-year improvement in
carbon intensity on the order of 6%, which is outside the range of historical experience.
The critical issue with the use of economy-wide data is whether it is representative of the sub-
set of the economy that the EU ETS comprises. Fortunately, data is available that can help resolve
this dilemma. Eurostat publishes data on the energy intensity of the EU economy as a whole and
of industry as distinct from transportation, households, agriculture, etc. While energy intensity is
not identical with CO2 intensity, it is an important determinant. Table 4 presents that comparison.
Table 3. Trends in Real GDP, CO2 emissions, and CO2 intensity.
Annual changes in percent
1995-2000 2000-2004
Real GDP +2.9 +1.8
CO2 Emissions +0.1 +1.0EU23
CO2 Intensity –2.7 –0.8
Real GDP +2.8 +1.6
CO2 Emissions +0.4 +1.1EU15
CO2 Intensity –2.3 –0.5
Real GDP +4.3 +3.6
CO2 Emissions –1.8 +0.2EE8
CO2 Intensity –5.8 –3.3
Source: CO2 emissions from EEA (2006a). Own calculations for GDP based
on IMF data weighted at 2004 PPP values. Intensity calculated.
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Table 4. Annual rates of improvement in European energy intensity.
Rate of improvement in the
economy’s energy intensity
Rate of improvement in the
industry’s energy intensity
1995-2000 2000-2004 1995-2000 2000-2003
EU25 –1.9 –0.5 –1.6 –0.1
EU15 –1.4 –0.4 –1.0 0.2
Austria –1.6 2.2 –0.5 1.8
Belgium –0.2 –3.0 –0.3 –0.4
Denmark –3.0 –0.9 –2.9 0.3
Finland –2.1 1.1 –2.4 –0.7
France –1.3 –0.2 – –
Germany –1.8 –0.1 –1.4 –0.3
Greece –0.4 –2.2 –1.5 –5.3
Ireland –3.9 –2.6 – –
Italy –0.6 0.3 1.1 –0.3
Luxembourg –4.5 1.0 –6.6 –5.1
Netherlands –2.8 0.6 –0.5 1.7
Portugal 0.4 –0.2 1.5 2.1
Spain –0.1 –0.5 0.1 1.9
Sweden –3.8 0.3 –3.5 –3.8
UK –1.9 –2.2 –1.3 0.6
Cyprus 0.1 –1.8 1.8 –2.9
CZ –1.6 –1.0 –5.1 –3.9
Estonia –6.8 –1.5 –9.6 –5.9
Hungary –3.8 –2.8 –6.7 –2.3
Latvia –4.8 –2.0 –3.8 –4.4
Lithuania –5.7 –1.5 –7.6 –0.9
Malta –1.1 –0.9 – –
Poland –5.9 –3.1 –7.5 –3.7
Slovakia –3.5 –2.7 –2.3 0.4
Slovenia –2.8 –0.9 –0.8 –1.2
Source: Eurostat and own calculations.
While the industry data do not extend to 2004, it is evident that for the EU as a whole, the
trends observed for energy intensity in the economy wide aggregates are true for the industrial
sector. The same break in trend around 2000 can be observed in energy intensity for the
industrial sectors and for the economy as a whole for the EU25 and the EU15, as well as for
fifteen of the twenty-five member states. For the ten member states with highlighted (in yellow)
figures in Table 4, a trend to increasing energy efficiency can be observed in either the economy-
wide or industry figures rates of change. However, when aggregated to the EU25 or EU15 level,
the data is consistent with a trend to less improvement in carbon intensity since 2000. Moreover,
the rates of improvement in energy intensity for the industrial sectors are generally not as great
for the economy as a whole and the slowdown in improvement is more pronounced for the
industrial sectors than for the economy as a whole.
A second source of data on emissions has been recently released by the European
Environmental Agency in its annual assessment of progress towards the Kyoto goals (EEA,
2006b). It provides indices of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for industry excluding
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construction through 2004 that permit comparison of late 1990s trends with the years since 2000.
Again, GHG emissions are not the same as CO2 emissions, but the latter constitute most of the
former. These data series show the same break in emissions trends around 2000 and rising GHG
emissions between 2002 and 2004.
Based on these two sources of data that are more directly applicable to the EU ETS sectors,
we believe that it is unlikely that the trends in CO2 intensity that were evident through 2004 for
the EU economies as a whole were not also broadly true for the EU ETS sectors. Given the
observed increase in real output for the EU ETS sectors, it is very unlikely that CO2 emissions
from the installations included in the scheme would have declined in the absence of the EU ETS
and the significant price that was paid for CO2 emissions in 2005.
4.4 Estimating the Counterfactual and Abatement
Figure 12 summarizes the problem of estimating the counterfactual and thereby determining
the amount of CO2 emission reduction that was effected by the EU ETS in 2005. There are two
data points: the imperfect baseline emissions, which we take to reflect approximately 2002
emissions of the EU ETS installations, and verified emissions in 2005. The critical issue is: What
would have been the rate of change in BAU emissions in the absence of the EU ETS?
Real GDP and the relevant sector-specific indicators of economic activity indicate annual
growth of about 2% for the EU as a whole. While the decline in carbon intensity since 2000 has
been significantly less than what was experienced in the 1990s, it has not stopped, so that 2%
annual growth in counterfactual CO2 emissions would seem to be an upper limit that would also
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Figure 12. A scenario for BAU emissions in the absence of the EU ETS.
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take account of the effect of the generally adverse weather conditions in 2005 and the effects of
higher natural gas prices on counterfactual emissions and the demand for EUAs. Given the
growth in real GDP and the post-2000 trend in CO2 intensity, it is unlikely that the lower limit on
the feasible growth of BAU emissions would be less than one percent. Accordingly, it appears
likely that counterfactual emissions increased to a level that in 2005 would have been from 3% to
6% higher than the level of emissions for the EU ETS installations in 2002. The two arrows in
Figure 12 represent these two limiting assumptions about the growth of CO2 emissions absent the
EU ETS, given what we can now observe concerning the growth in real output in the EU ETS
sectors, the post-2000 trend in CO2 intensity, and the evolution of CO2 emissions through 2004.
Assuming for the moment that the baseline emissions accurately reflect 2002 emissions for
the EU ETS installations, these limiting assumptions imply that the counterfactual lies between
2.14 and 2.21 billion tons of CO2. Since verified emissions are 2.01 billion tons, the indicated
reduction of CO2 emissions is between approximately 130 and 200 million tons, or 7% to 10% of
what emissions would otherwise have been. However, the assumption of an accurate baseline is
open to serious challenge because of the less than ideal conditions under which the baseline data
on installation level emissions were collected. These conditions undoubtedly produced errors,
but errors operate in both directions. The more serious concern in estimating a counterfactual is
the likelihood of bias, which would imply that the errors are disproportionately and
systematically in one direction. To the best of our knowledge, no one has done the empirical
work to prove the bias or to develop a better estimate of the level of historical emissions for the
EU ETS installations prior to 2005 or of counterfactual emissions in 2005. In any case, the
critical issue is: What is the magnitude of bias? Or to turn the question around: How much bias
would have to be assumed to support a conclusion of no abatement of CO2 emissions by EU ETS
installations in 2005?
One way of addressing this question is to take a country-specific approach to estimating
counterfactual emissions that allows a distinction to be made among member states in adjusting
baselines. The primary distinction would be between the new accession countries of Eastern
Europe and the EU 15. For the former, historical data were of poor quality and of questionable
relevance given the ongoing rapid structural change in those economies. Consequently, there was
a greater tendency to rely on projections instead of historical data in allocating allowances at the
installation level. Generally, these conditions did not exist among the EU15 or nearly to the same
degree. Accordingly, it is plausible that more bias exists in the baselines of the East European
states than in those of the EU15.
To develop the alternative estimate of the counterfactual, we take the reported baseline
emissions (without adjustment) and assume that CO2 emissions in the EU ETS sectors increased
at an annual rate that is the product of the annual increase in observed real GDP between 2002
and 2005 and the rate of decline in CO2 intensity that was experienced between 2000 and 2004
for each country. That calculation and the resulting data are provided in detail in Appendix VI
and summarized in the first panel of Table 5.
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Table 5. A country-specific approach to calculating emission reductions.
Baseline
Emissions
(Mt CO2)
2005 BAU
Emissions
(Mt CO2)
Verified
Emissions
(Mt CO2)
Indicated
Reduction
(Mt CO2)
Percent
Reduction
Without adjustment of baseline emissions
EU23 2,078 2,150 (+3.5%) 2,007 –144 –6.7%
EU15 1,677 1,729 (+3.1%) 1,637 –93 –5.4%
EE8 401 421 (+4.8%) 370 –51 –12.1%
With adjustment of baseline emissions
EU23 1,946 (–6.4%) 2,014 (+3.5%) 2,007 –7.6 –0.4%
EU15 1,593 (–5.0%) 1,642 (+3.1%) 1,637 –5.5 –0.3%
EE8 353 (–12.0%) 370 (+4.8%) 370 –0.2 –0.1%
Source: Own calculations based on data from CITL, DEHSt (2005), EEA (2006a) and IMF.
The indicated growth in counterfactual emissions for the EU15 and EE8 between 2002 and
2005 is 3.1% and 4.8%, respectively, or 3.5% for the EU as a whole. The indicated abatement is
nearly 145 million tons or 7% with percentage reductions of 5.4% for the EU15 and 12.1% for
the eight East European member states.
The greater proportionate reduction in the East than in the West seems unlikely. There
probably was some abatement in the East, and no doubt cheaper abatement opportunities exist
there than in the EU15; but firms in Eastern Europe are less attuned to market opportunities than
those in the EU15; and, if they are, they would have been impeded from trading by the delays in
final approvals of several NAPs and in setting up the East European registries. A more likely
explanation is that the baseline emissions for the East European countries contain more bias than
those of the EU15. Accordingly, the second panel of Table 5 repeats the same calculation
concerning growth of emissions that was made in the first panel but from baselines that have
been lowered by percentages that would be required to sustain a conclusion of no abatement in
the EU15 and EE8. The implied adjustments are 5% for EU15 countries and 12% for the eight
new accession members. Both of these seem unlikely to us as estimates of cumulative, systemic
bias, although undoubtedly errors of this magnitude will exist in the data for individual
installations or small sub-sets.
Until better estimates based on more detailed country- and sector-specific research have been
done, it is not possible to make a reliable estimate of abatement. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that
there was no abatement in 2005. It is also unlikely that the abatement was as much as 200
million tons. The tentative calculations presented in Table 5 would suggest 140 million tons
adjusted downward by however much is the bias in the baseline emissions data. An amount half
this much—abatement of slightly over 3%—seems not unreasonable, but it is arbitrary and must
remain so until better data and more careful assessments can be made.
In the meantime, the refutable presumption must be that the EU ETS succeeded in abating
CO2 emissions in 2005 based on three observations.
1. A Positive EUA Price. A significant price is being paid for CO2, which reason suggests
would have the effect of reducing emissions as firms adjust to this new economic reality.
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2. Rising Real Output. Real output in the EU has been rising at the same time that the rate
of improvement in CO2 intensity has been declining, which has led to rising CO2
emissions before 2005.
3. Historical Emissions Data indicate a reduction of emissions even after allowing for
plausible bias.
The amount of emission reduction in 2005 may be modest, but so is the ambition of the first
period cap. Given the problems of getting the system started and the changes in management and
regulatory practice implied, even a modest amount of abatement may seem surprising, but the
available evidence makes it hard to argue that there was none.
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The question posed in the title of this paper is whether the 2005 emissions data reveal over-
allocation or abatement. Any reasonable answer to this question will acknowledge that both have
occurred and this paper has attempted to develop estimates of the magnitude of both.
Over-allocation has the unfortunate attribute of depending on the eye of the beholder,
especially when viewed ex post. Nevertheless, there are plausible, empirical measures that can be
developed. The one that we suggest is the ratio of an aggregate’s net long (short) position to the
sum of the long (short) positions of that aggregate’s components. When some sizeable aggregate
is long on balance and this ratio is close to unity, the likelihood of over-allocation is high. As we
have noted, there are circumstances that would produce a high ratio without over-allocation, so
that the presumption of over-allocation can be refuted if such circumstance can be convincingly
shown. It is also possible that the over-allocation was intentional, as was arguably the case for
the industrial sectors included in the EU ETS, in which case the attribute is the reflection of some
equity consideration. Our analysis based on the application of the net ratio indicates that over-
allocation occurred and that its magnitude may have been as much as 100 million EUAs.
Whatever the extent of over-allocation, that estimate does not say much about abatement. In a
trading system, it is not the allocation to an installation that causes a firm to reduce emissions,
but the price that it must pay, even if in opportunity cost, for its emissions. Whatever one thinks
of the allocation in the first period, there can be no doubt that a price was paid and a cost
incurred for CO2 emissions emitted by covered installations in 2005. Therefore, the question can
be posed: What was the effect of this price? The data to answer this question are not nearly as
good as they should be, but our analysis of what is available indicates that CO2 emissions were
reduced by an amount that was probably larger than 50 million tons and less than 200 million
tons.
These very tentative estimates of over-allocation and abatement have important implications.
If abatement was at least 50 million tons, more than half (and perhaps all) of the long position
revealed for the EU as a whole by the 2005 emissions data cannot be attributed to over-
allocation. If over-allocation has occurred, even if on the order of 100 million tons, the clear
implication is that EUA prices are lower because of the over-allocation, assuming those EUAs
have found (or will find) their way to the market.
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This reasoning raises the interesting question of what was the source of the surprise that
caused EUA prices to drop so sharply when the 2005 emissions data were revealed in April and
May of 2006. It cannot have been the total number of allowances, which had been known since
at least mid-2005 when the last first period NAP was approved. Moreover, that total included
whatever “over-allocation” had occurred and all observers recognized that this cap was not very
demanding. The surprise concerned the revealed level of emissions. One plausible explanation is
that market observers had over-estimated the level of CO2 emissions and the demand for
allowances caused by rising real output, the adverse weather in 2005, and the higher prices for
natural gas relative to coal. But, another more intriguing possibility is that market observers
under-estimated the amount of abatement that would occur in the first year of the EU ETS as the
managers of affected facilities incorporated CO2 prices into their production decisions. When
revealed to be wrong, an under-estimate of abatement would have the same effect on EUA prices
as an over-estimate of counterfactual emissions. Our analysis suggests that such an under-
estimate is a distinct possibility. Moreover, experience with emissions trading regimes in the
U.S. has shown that unexpected abatement always occurs. And it is unexpected because
abatement is so often conceived as resulting only from large machines that engineers can design
and regulators mandate and not from the small, incremental changes in production and
production processes that managers of existing facilities make in adjusting to new economic
realities. These pedestrian changes can cumulatively make a perceptible difference and they are
one of the main reasons for choosing market-based instruments, such as the EU ETS.
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Appendix I: An overview on the situation in each member state.
Gross Short Gross Long
Net Short /
Net LongAllocation
2005
(t CO2)
Verified
emissions
2005 (t CO2)
Total
number of
instal-
lations t CO2 %
instal-
lations t CO2 %
instal-
lations t CO2 %
Installations
where
allowances
equal
emissions
TOTAL 1,995,439,047 1,916,174,516 10,046 180,359,321 9.0 2,903 259,623,852 13.0 6,800 79.3 4.0 343
Austria 32,414,872 33,372,841 203 3,311,430 10.2 78 2,353,461 7.3 122 –1.0 –3.0 3
Belgium 58,312,155 55,354,096 308 9,986,382 17.1 73 12,944,441 22.2 235 3.0 5.1 0
Denmark 37,303,720 26,475,718 381 132,605 0.4 59 10,960,607 29.4 316 10.8 29.0 6
Finland 44,657,504 33,099,660 600 461,390 1.0 185 12,019,234 26.9 327 11.6 25.9 88
France 150,393,692 131,257,908 1086 4,218,956 2.8 178 23,354,740 15.5 895 19.1 12.7 13
Germany 494,951,117 474,005,179 1850 25,256,328 5.1 605 46,202,266 9.3 1,239 20.9 4.2 6
Greece 71,135,034 71,250,370 140 5,324,854 7.5 68 5,209,518 7.3 72 –0.1 –0.2 0
Ireland 19,236,747 22,397,678 114 4,231,567 22.0 53 1,070,636 5.6 56 –3.2 –16.4 5
Italy 215,799,016 225,335,126 955 28,453,211 13.2 538 18,917,101 8.8 404 –9.5 –4.4 13
Luxembourg 3,229,321 2,603,349 15 0 0.0 0 625,972 19.4 15 0.6 19.4 0
Netherlands 86,452,491 80,351,292 209 6,151,089 7.1 54 12,252,288 14.2 153 6.1 7.1 2
Portugal 36,898,516 36,425,933 244 1,771,813 4.8 56 2,244,396 6.1 184 0.5 1.3 4
Spain 172,130,788 182,893,568 827 34,816,872 20.2 221 24,054,092 14.0 573 –10.8 –6.3 33
Sweden 22,281,227 19,315,482 705 3,171,150 14.2 204 6,136,895 27.5 436 3.0 13.3 65
UK 206,025,867 242,464,097 779 50,927,842 24.7 348 14,489,612 7.0 344 –36.4 –17.7 87
Cz Republic 96,910,587 82,454,636 395 168,911 0.2 42 14,624,862 15.1 352 14.5 14.9 1
Estonia 16,747,054 12,621,824 43 14,832 0.1 2 4,140,062 24.7 40 4.1 24.6 1
Hungary 30,236,166 26,027,616 235 1,178,982 3.9 49 5,387,532 17.8 185 4.2 13.9 1
Latvia 4,070,078 2,854,424 96 23,834 0.6 12 1,239,488 30.5 78 1.2 29.9 6
Lithuania 13,503,454 6,603,869 100 7,046 0.1 3 6,906,631 51.1 90 6.9 51.1 7
Poland 143,140,900 115,057,531 488 549,754 0.4 34 28,633,123 20.0 454 28.1 19.6 0
Slovakia 30,470,677 25,231,769 175 46,789 0.2 18 5,285,697 17.3 156 5.2 17.2 1
Slovenia 9,138,064 8,720,550 98 153,684 1.7 23 571,198 6.3 74 0.4 4.6 1
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Appendix II. An overview on each sector’s situation.
Gross Short Gross Long Net Short / Net LongAllocation
2005 (t CO2)
2005 verified
emissions (t CO2)
Total number
of installations t CO2 % t CO2 % t CO2 %
POWER&HEAT
EU23 1,170,783,068 1,198,708,781 3570 157,660,503 13.5 129,208,590 11.0 28,451,913 2.4
EU15 935,411,200 998,243,257 2723 155,936,049 16.7 92,571,173 9.9 63,364,876 6.8
EE8 235,371,868 200,465,524 847 1,724,454 0.7 36,637,417 15.6 –34,912,963 –14.8
REFINERIES
EU23 142,553,291 132,997,989 136 2,687,055 1.9 12,204,279 8.6 –9,517,224 –6.7
EU15 137,067,072 128,756,423 126 2,687,055 2.0 10,959,626 8.0 –8,272,571 –6.0
EE8 5,486,219 4,241,566 10 0.0 1,244,653 22.7 –1,244,653 –22.7
IRON, STEEL & COKE
EU23 159,638,364 127,241,724 235 1,816,331 1.1 34,203,974 21.4 –32,387,643 –20.3
EU15 141,054,277 119,159,278 210 1,791,809 1.3 23,677,811 16.8 –21,886,002 –15.5
EE8 18,584,087 8,082,446 25 24,522 0.1 10,526,163 56.6 –10,501,641 –56.5
PULP&PAPER
EU23 38,635,691 30,628,002 795 771,988 2.0 8,485,611 22.0 –7,713,623 –20.0
EU15 35,629,925 28,734,717 720 762,395 2.1 7,387,681 20.7 –6,625,286 –18.6
EE8 3,005,766 1,893,285 75 9,593 0.3 1,097,930 36.5 –1,088,337 –36.2
CEMENT&LIME
EU23 174,663,015 161,419,401 462 7,534,377 4.3 19,873,806 11.4 –12,339,429 –7.1
EU15 155,051,883 147,237,414 399 7,464,191 4.8 14,374,475 9.3 –6,910,284 –4.5
EE8 19,611,132 14,181,987 63 70,186 0.4 5,499,331 28.0 –5,429,145 –27.7
GLASS
EU23 19,315,789 17,112,080 344 464,039 2.4 2,462,392 12.7 –1,998,353 –10.3
EU15 17,127,707 15,407,853 297 450,383 2.6 1,934,143 11.3 –1,483,760 –8.7
EE8 2,188,082 1,704,227 47 13,656 0.6 528,249 24.1 –514,593 –23.5
CERAMICS, BRICKS&TILES
EU23 16,430,329 13,257,432 1035 475,507 2.9 3,401,801 20.7 –2,922,327 –17.8
EU15 13,662,675 11,090,958 868 427,983 3.1 2,721,570 19.9 –2,293,587 –16.8
EE8 2,767,654 2,166,474 167 47,524 1.7 680,231 24.6 –628,740 –22.7
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Appendix IIIa. An overview on the data used to derive GDP trends in each member state.
Gross domestic product at constant market prices
(Billions, National currency)
1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Austria 182.0 210.4 212.1 214.0 216.3 221.6 226.1
Belgium 220.8 251.5 254.5 258.2 260.6 266.8 270.9
Denmark 1124.1 1294.0 1303.1 1309.2 1318.2 1342.9 1386.2
Finland 104.8 132.3 135.8 138.0 140.4 145.4 149.6
France 1263.3 1442.5 1468.7 1485.0 1501.8 1532.3 1550.6
Germany 1873.8 2062.5 2088.1 2088.3 2083.2 2109.2 2127.5
Greece 79.9 94.7 99.5 103.3 108.2 113.3 117.4
Ireland 76.2 121.0 127.9 135.6 141.5 147.6 155.7
Italy 1083.8 1191.1 1212.4 1216.6 1217.0 1230.0 1229.6
Luxembourg 16.3 22.0 22.6 23.4 23.9 24.9 25.9
Netherlands 367.4 441.4 447.7 448.1 449.6 458.4 465.4
Portugal 100.1 122.3 124.7 125.7 124.3 125.7 126.2
Spain 515.4 630.3 652.6 670.1 690.2 711.5 735.9
Sweden 1891.3 2217.3 2241.0 2285.7 2324.4 2411.5 2476.6
UK 884.7 1035.3 1059.6 1081.5 1110.3 1146.5 1167.8
Cz Republic 2031.1 2189.2 2242.9 2285.5 2367.8 2467.6 2617.8
Estonia 70.9 92.9 98.9 106.1 113.2 122.0 134.0
Hungary 10820.8 13272.2 13846.9 14375.4 14861.6 15637.1 16280.7
Latvia 3.6 4.8 5.1 5.5 5.9 6.4 7.0
Lithuania 37.1 45.8 48.8 52.1 57.6 61.6 66.2
Poland 337.2 438.6 443.5 449.8 467.0 491.6 508.3
Slovakia 785.6 941.3 971.7 1011.7 1053.8 1110.8 1178.8
Slovenia 2404.6 2981.0 3060.2 3165.9 3249.8 3385.2 3516.2
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2006.
Notes: Estimates start after 2005, except for Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Latvia and Poland where estimates start after 2004
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Appendix IIIb. An overview on the data used to calculate GDP based on IMF data weighted at 2004 PPP values.
2004 weights Country-specific indices at constant prices2004 GDP based on PPP
valuation of country GDP
(Billions, current intern. dollar) Region EU23 2002 2003 2004 2005
EU 23 - - - 100.0 101.4 103.9 105.8
EU 15 - 1.0000 0.9145 100.0 101.1 103.3 104.9
EE 8 - 1.0000 0.0855 100.0 104.1 109.6 114.8
Austria 263.3 0.0242 0.0221 100.0 101.1 103.6 105.7
Belgium 313.5 0.0288 0.0263 100.0 100.9 103.3 104.9
Denmark 179.4 0.0165 0.0151 100.0 100.7 102.6 105.9
Finland 156.3 0.0144 0.0131 100.0 101.8 105.3 108.4
France 1758.9 0.1616 0.1478 100.0 101.1 103.2 104.4
Germany 2440.4 0.2242 0.2050 100.0 99.8 101.0 101.9
Greece 234.9 0.0216 0.0197 100.0 104.8 109.7 113.7
Ireland 155.9 0.0143 0.0131 100.0 104.3 108.8 114.8
Italy 1627.0 0.1495 0.1367 100.0 100.0 101.1 101.1
Luxembourg 30.1 0.0028 0.0025 100.0 102.0 106.4 110.7
Netherlands 487.6 0.0448 0.0410 100.0 100.3 102.3 103.9
Portugal 197.4 0.0181 0.0166 100.0 98.9 100.0 100.4
Spain 1028.8 0.0945 0.0864 100.0 103.0 106.2 109.8
Sweden 257.0 0.0236 0.0216 100.0 101.7 105.5 108.4
UK 1753.3 0.1611 0.1473 100.0 102.7 106.0 108.0
Cz Republic 175.8 0.1727 0.0148 100.0 103.6 108.0 114.5
Estonia 20.2 0.0198 0.0017 100.0 106.7 115.0 126.3
Hungary 160.2 0.1574 0.0135 100.0 103.4 108.8 113.3
Latvia 26.4 0.0260 0.0022 100.0 107.2 116.5 128.4
Lithuania 44.3 0.0435 0.0037 100.0 110.5 118.2 127.0
Poland 469.4 0.4611 0.0394 100.0 103.8 109.3 113.0
Slovakia 80.6 0.0791 0.0068 100.0 104.2 109.8 116.5
Slovenia 41.0 0.0403 0.0034 100.0 102.7 106.9 111.1
Source: Derived from the authors from IMF.
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Appendix IV: CO2 emissions excluding net CO2 from LULUCF (CO2 equivalent, Gg).
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
EU23 3,935,715 4,041,282 3,978,984 3,982,571 3,939,944 3,950,391 4,024,554 4,001,167 4,089,716 4,106,598
EU15 3,283,298 3,361,793 3,310,521 3,354,289 3,331,210 3,355,237 3,420,438 3,415,643 3,484,853 3,505,887
EE8 652,417 679,489 668,463 628,283 608,734 595,154 604,116 585,524 604,863 600,711
Austria 63,655 67,321 67,146 66,828 65,435 66,178 70,171 71,935 77,553 77,077
Belgium 123,632 127,762 122,272 127,933 122,911 123,986 124,110 123,311 126,974 126,907
Denmark 60,450 73,967 64,464 60,403 57,532 53,070 54,669 54,262 59,454 53,941
Finland 58,105 63,916 62,609 59,233 58,845 57,113 62,563 65,043 73,099 69,115
France 392,983 406,682 400,834 421,272 411,141 405,647 409,263 404,706 412,090 417,353
Germany 920,155 943,608 914,700 906,672 881,685 886,258 899,301 886,480 892,545 885,854
Greece 87,426 89,623 94,361 98,966 98,141 103,963 106,210 105,905 109,914 110,280
Ireland 34,783 36,081 38,504 40,306 42,136 44,241 46,704 45,701 44,519 45,266
Italy 445,384 438,843 443,056 454,031 459,051 463,311 469,062 470,821 486,126 489,590
Luxembourg 9,276 9,390 8,681 7,705 8,437 8,952 9,227 10,226 10,702 11,997
Netherlands 170,694 178,100 171,627 173,100 167,779 169,680 175,113 174,853 178,178 180,675
Portugal 53,131 50,258 53,543 58,234 64,894 63,762 65,018 69,250 64,600 65,705
Spain 255,724 242,993 262,655 270,747 296,302 307,673 311,552 330,551 333,837 354,562
Sweden 58,206 61,713 57,127 57,624 54,771 53,503 54,245 55,401 56,469 55,360
UK 549,695 571,537 548,942 551,236 542,151 547,901 563,230 547,198 558,792 562,204
Cz Republic 132,125 133,863 138,389 129,188 122,099 129,017 129,033 124,040 128,075 127,297
Estonia 19,315 20,264 20,225 18,318 16,771 16,849 17,103 17,312 19,106 19,232
Hungary 60,870 62,220 60,478 60,139 60,015 57,803 59,360 57,703 60,461 59,149
Latvia 8,802 9,081 8,535 8,157 7,550 6,907 7,410 7,331 7,477 7,485
Lithuania 24,384 21,477 18,570 15,663 14,884 14,105 13,326 12,704 12,287 13,350
Poland 348,172 372,530 361,626 337,448 329,697 314,373 317,844 308,277 319,082 315,234
Slovakia 14,908 15,666 15,978 15,722 15,088 15,177 16,145 16,212 16,012 16,464
Slovenia 43,841 44,389 44,662 43,649 42,630 40,924 43,896 41,945 42,362 42,498
Source: European Environmental Agency (2006), Annual European Community greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2004 and inventory report 2006, EEA Technical report
No. 6/2006, Copenhagen.
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Appendix Va. Energy intensity of the economy (Gross inland consumption of energy divided by GDP at
constant prices, 1995; kgoe per 1000 Euro).
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
EU 25 230.4 235.0 227.6 224.2 214.9 208.8 209.7 206.5 207.6 204.9
EU 15 205.4 209.4 202.7 201.0 195.7 190.5 191.4 188.4 189.5 187.5
Austria 145.8 151.0 148.2 144.8 139.6 134.4 142.8 139.9 149.0 146.1
Belgium 238.6 252.3 249.0 248.8 244.0 236.1 228.1 213.6 217.4 208.2
Denmark 146.9 161.7 146.5 140.7 132.1 125.0 126.6 123.8 126.1 120.3
Finland 290.6 302.4 299.1 288.9 276.0 260.1 263.8 272.2 280.1 272.1
France 199.7 209.3 198.6 197.7 191.0 186.6 188.3 186.1 188.5 185.5
Germany 175.2 179.2 174.2 170.2 163.9 159.7 162.5 158.7 161.0 158.8
Greece 268.5 276.1 268.3 272.7 262.5 263.6 260.6 258.0 247.8 240.4
Ireland 217.0 213.4 201.7 196.8 187.7 175.1 172.5 166.1 155.2 156.9
Italy 192.4 190.1 189.0 191.4 190.9 186.9 184.0 184.1 189.2 189.1
Luxembourg 241.2 238.0 216.5 197.9 192.9 186.6 190.7 196.7 181.8 194.3
Netherlands 231.2 233.2 221.3 211.7 202.1 198.5 200.7 201.1 202.2 203.2
Portugal 237.3 228.6 233.2 239.2 247.4 241.5 243.9 254.7 234.7 239.6
Spain 228.7 220.3 222.7 223.6 227.0 227.0 225.4 226.3 219.7 222.5
Sweden 265.5 268.4 255.4 248.5 238.2 215.0 228.9 224.3 217.1 217.5
UK 251.5 256.1 242.0 242.7 234.3 227.3 223.7 214.5 212.1 207.2
Cz Republic 965.8 952.1 969.5 946.5 868.4 888.4 883.9 875.8 891.2 851.8
Estonia 1835.2 1863.4 1659.2 1495.3 1398.1 1214.8 1273.0 1153.2 1179.1 1140.2
Hungary 740.6 747.5 700.5 661.9 642.0 600.5 588.6 579.6 566.6 534.1
Latvia 994.4 921.3 793.3 740.5 840.9 756.0 816.5 750.3 725.1 696.3
Lithuania 1691.7 1735.2 1531.8 1592.4 1372.2 1208.4 1256.8 1272.7 1194.8 1135.6
Poland 962.8 972.9 878.5 792.3 730.2 680.2 673.5 654.2 623.1 596.6
Slovakia 1155.4 1051.8 1055.8 997.6 976.5 955.9 1015.8 976.0 929.6 854.3
Slovenia 397.3 402.0 388.4 371.8 348.1 341.7 349.6 344.6 341.1 329.2
Source: Eurostat.
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Appendix Vb. Energy intensity of industry (index 1995 = 100).
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
EU 25 100 100.2 98.5 94.9 91.6 91.8 91.4 90.2 91.6
EU 15 100 99.9 98.8 96.6 95 95.2 95.4 94.2 95.9
Austria 100 100.7 109.4 105.9 97.1 97.5 95.5 100 102.7
Belgium 100 95.5 97.2 98.6 100.7 98.5 97.8 91.9 97.3
Denmark 100 100.7 95.9 93.4 90.7 85.3 87.6 87.1 86
Finland 100 98 98 94.8 95.6 88.2 84.6 86.5 86.3
Germany 100 100.3 94.4 92.8 90.2 92.8 90.5 90.1 92.1
Greece 100 102.6 104.6 99.3 91.3 92.4 87.8 85.3 77.7
Italy 100 99 101.3 98.6 105.2 105.6 100.8 101.2 104.7
Luxembourg 100 95.1 80.9 66.3 68.8 67.2 62.7 58.7 57
Netherlands 100 102.4 101.6 99 94.3 97.7 96.6 96.5 102.7
Portugal 100 97 101.7 105.4 105.9 107.5 121.4 114.3 114.2
Spain 100 95 99.4 98.2 92.5 100.3 102.6 103.6 105.9
Sweden 100 99.9 95.6 90.9 84.8 82.5 76.8 74.6 73.1
UK 100 100.9 100.1 96.1 97.6 93.7 97.3 92.2 95.4
Cz Republic 100 90.4 93.2 91.6 72.6 74.6 74.3 68.9 65.8
Estonia 100 106 84.1 70 55.4 51.8 53.1 41.7 42.7
Hungary 100 102.5 86 79.7 71.5 66.6 67.6 68.7 62
Latvia 100 156.2 144.3 101.9 93.8 81.1 77.8 74.5 70.3
Lithuania 100 89 86.5 76 66.8 62.1 56.8 58.1 60.4
Poland 100 99.7 89.6 75.6 64.2 62.6 58.7 57.1 55.6
Slovakia 100 86.1 89.4 82.6 79.7 88.6 91 93.1 89.6
Slovenia 100 95.7 92.3 85.8 85.3 95.9 85.4 80.4 92.4
Source: Eurostat.
34
Appendix VI. An overview of the data relevant for member state abatement.
Base period
emissions
(Mt CO2)
Observed
annual GDP
growth rate
 of 2002–2005
Assumed annual
rate of change of
carbon intensity
2000–2004
Implied
annual rate
of increase
of CO2
Counterfactual
2005 BAU
emissions
(Mt CO2)
Verified
emissions
2005
(Mt CO2)
Difference
BAU–2005
emissions
(Mt CO2)
Difference
BAU–2005
emissions
(%)
EU23 2,078.0 – – 1.1% 2150.1 2006.6 –143.5 –6.7
EU15 1676.6 – – 1.0% 1729.3 1636.6 –92.7 –5.4
EE8 401.4 – – 1.6% 420.7 370.0 –50.8 –12.1
Austria 30.2 1.9% +2.2% 4.0% 34.0 33.4 –0.7 –2.0
Belgium 63.0 1.6% –0.9% 0.7% 64.4 55.4 –9.0 –14.0
Denmark 30.9 2.0% –0.5% 1.4% 32.2 26.5 –5.8 –17.9
Finland 36.2 2.8% +1.8% 4.6% 41.5 33.1 –8.4 –20.2
France 141.1 1.5% –0.8% 0.6% 143.8 131.3 –12.5 –8.7
Germany 501.0 0.6% –0.6% 0.1% 501.8 474.0 –27.8 –5.5
Greece 70.1 4.6% –3.3% 1.2% 72.7 71.3 –1.5 –2.0
Ireland 20.9 4.9% –4.7% 0.3% 21.1 22.4 +1.3 +6.3
Italy 224.0 0.4% +0.5% 0.9% 229.9 225.3 –4.6 –2.0
Luxembourg 2.9 3.6% +3.0% 6.5% 3.5 2.6 –0.9 –25.8
Netherlands 89.5 1.3% +0.6% 1.8% 94.5 80.4 –14.2 –15.0
Portugal 36.6 0.1% +0.0% 0.2% 36.8 36.4 –0.4 –1.0
Spain 164.1 3.3% +0.1% 3.3% 181.2 182.9 +1.7 +0.9
Sweden 20.2 2.8% –1.3% 1.4% 21.1 19.3 –1.8 –8.5
UK 245.9 2.7% –2.0% 0.7% 250.8 242.5 –8.4 –3.3
Cz Republic 89.0 4.8% –3.4% 1.4% 92.9 82.5 –10.4 –11.2
Estonia 12.4 8.8% –4.4% 4.3% 14.1 12.6 –1.5 –10.5
Hungary 32.0 4.4% –3.7% 0.7% 32.7 26.0 –6.6 –20.3
Latvia 3.7 9.5% –6.0% 3.4% 4.1 2.9 –1.2 –30.3
Lithuania 9.0 9.0% –9.2% –0.2% 8.9 6.6 –2.3 –26.2
Poland 219.8 4.3% –2.9% 1.5% 229.6 205.4 –24.2 –10.5
Slovakia 26.5 5.5% –2.4% 3.0% 29.0 25.2 –3.8 –13.0
Slovenia 9.0 3.7% –2.4% 1.3% 9.4 8.7 –0.6 –6.8
Notes: Polish data assumed according to footnote 3. Base period data from DEHSt (2005); GDP growth rate based on own calculations of weighted GDP;
carbon intensity figures derived from EEA data on CO2.
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